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Debtor had executed security agreements and mortgages
placing as collateral his livestock, farm machinery, and certain real
property.' After the debtor defaulted, the secured creditor
repossessed the pledged personal property and sold the collateral at
various farm machinery and livestock auction sales 2 and applied the
sales proceeds against the debt. 3 Subsequently, the creditor
obtained a deficiency judgment and foreclosed on the mcrtgaged
real property. 4 Debtor appealed the judgment and foreclosure to
the North Dakota Supreme Court, 5 alleging the creditor failed to
1. State Bank of Towner v. Hansen, 302 N.W.2d 760 (N.D. 1981). Hansen was a consolidated
appeal of two separate judgments. Hansen, the debtor, appealed a deficiency judgment in the
amount of $242,366.20 and a foreclosure of mortgaged real property to satisfy the deficiency. Id. at
763.
Hansen had borrowed money from Pioneer State Bank in Towner, Noith Dakota, to finance
his ranching operations. Pioneer State Bank subsequently was put into receivership and the State
Bank of Towner received the loans through a receivership transfer. Id. at 763 n. 1.
Between Hansen and his widowed mother, the livestock owned totaled about 750 head and the
land was listed at about 1040 acres. Brief for Appellant at 2, 47, State Bank ofTowner v. Hansen,
302 N.W.2d 760 (N.D. 1981).
2. 302 N.W.2d at 763-64. The Bank used a total of three auction sales to dispose of the
repossessed collateral, which had been obtained under court order. Two separate and distinct sales
were used to sell the farm machinery. The third auction was strictly for sale of the livestock. The
repossession of the personal property occurred prior to the filing of suit for a deficiency judgment. Id.
3. Brief for Appellant at 4, 6, State Bank of Towner v. Hansen, 302 N.W.2d 760 (N.D. 1981).
The Bank, in seeking to repossess the collateral, stated in an affidavit that the actual value was
$150,000. After the collateral was sold, Hansen received a credit of $45,109 against his debt. Id.
4. 302 N.W.2d at 760-61. The district court of McKenzie County entered judgment in
creditor's favor. Id.
5. N.D.R. App. P. 1. North Dakota lacks an intermediate level of appellate courts, thus all
appeals from district courts and county courts of increased jurisdiction go directly to the North
Dakota Supreme C, urt. Id. See N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 1-3.
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provide notice 6 of sale of the repossessed collateral, 7 and therefore should be absolutely barred from obtaining a deficiency
judgment.8 Creditor raised as a defense the perishable collateral
and customary sales market exceptions to the notice requirement
found in section 41-09-50 of the North Dakota Century Code. 9 The
North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district court and
held that the debtor was entitled to notice. ° The court further
stated that in the subsequent action for deficiency judgment, the
violation of the notice requirement gave rise to a presumption that
6. 302 N.W.2d at 766. Notice requirements are found in section 41-09-50(3) of the North
Dakota Century Code, which provides:
Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and may be made
by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or in
parcels and at any time and place and on any terms, but every aspect of the
disposition, including the method, manner, time, place, and terms must be
commercially reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline
speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable
notification of the time and place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the
time after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be
sent by the secured party to the debtor, if he has not signed after default a statement
renouncing or modifying his right to notification of sale. In the case of consumer goods
no other notification need be sent. In other cases notification shall be sent to any other
secured party from whom the secured party has received (before sending his
notification to the debtor or before the debtor's renunciation of his rights) written
notice of a claim of an interest in the collateral. The secured party may buy at any
public sale and if the collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized market or is
of a type which is the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations, he may
buy at private sale.N.D.

CENT. CODE § 41-09-50(3) (Supp. 1981) (U.C.C. § 9-504(3)).
7. 302 N.W.2d at 760-64. In addition, Hansen also raised the following issues: First, the Bank
was liable in tort for conversion of personal property; second, the Bank failed to dispose of the
collateral in a commercially reasonable manner; and third, after proceeding against personal
property, the Bank should not be allowed to foreclose on the real property. The Bank conceded that
notice was not furnished Hansen prior to any sale. Id.
8. Id. at 766. See Bank of Gering v, Glover, 192 Neb. 575, 223 N.W.2d 56 (1974). In Bank qf
Gering defendant-appellee was an accommodation maker on a note covered by a security agreement
in certain inventory, furniture, fixtures, and accounts receivable. Plaintiff-appellant had taken
possession of the collateral, solicited bids, and sold it. Id. at 577, 223 N.W.2d at 57. The Supreme
Court of Nebraska affirmed the trial court's ruling that the appellant, a secured creditor, was not
entitled to a deficiency judgment against appellee who had received no notice of sale. The court
found that notification was a condition precedent to a secured creditor's right to a deficiency
judgment and compliance with an act framed in the creditor's interest was not an onerous burden.
Id. at 579-80, 223 N.W.2d at 57-59. See also Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Wathen, 288 Md. 119, 414
A.2d 1261 (1980) (notice deemed condition precedent to receiving a deficiency judgment).
9. 302 N.W.2d at 765-66. The applicable portion of section 41-09-50(3) of the North Dakota
Century Code is as follows:

Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type
customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of time and place of
any . . . sale or other intended disposition . . . to be made shall be sent by the secured
party to the debtor, if he has not signed after default a statement renouncing or
modifying his right to notification of sale.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-50(3) (Supp. 1981) (U.C.C. 5 9-504(3)).
10. 302 N.W.2d at 766. Having determined from the record that the livestock and farm
machinery were neither perishable nor customarily sold on a recognized market, the Hansen court
found as a matter of law that secured creditors must notify debtors prior to the sale of collateral. Id.
The court then granted-Hansen a new trial on the merits with jury instructions to be provided in
accordance with the court's findings. Id. (construing N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-50(3) (Supp. 1981)

(U.C.C. 5 9-504(3))).
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the value of the collateral was equal to the indebtedness and that the
burden of rebuttal was on the secured creditor." State Bank of
Towner v. Hansen, 302 N.W.2d 760 (N.D. 1981).
The general purpose of notice of sale of repossessed collateral
is to provide the debtor with an opportunity to take appropriate
steps to protect his interest in the collateral and to prevent undue
2
prejudice in the disposition of the collateral by a secured creditor.'
The importance of notice is that the amount of a deficiency
judment will be inversely proportional to the sales price.' 3 Notice
thus protects the debtor from low and unreasonable sales prices. 14
Many of the Uniform Commercial Code provisions governing
default have their historical antecedents in the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act ('U.C.S.A.). 15 Courts construing default
provisions under the U.C.S.A. generally have held a proper resale,
including notice, to be a condition precedent to a seller's right to
recover a deficiency. 16
11. Id. at 767. (citing State Bank of Burleigh County Trust Co. v. All-American Sub, Inc., 289N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1980)). The court in Hansen found the presumption and shifting of burden of
proof the least harsh and most conducive to the U.C.C.'s intent of commercial reasonableness. Id. at
766-67. (construing N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-01-06 (1968) (U.C.C. § 1-106)).
12. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Conner, 415 A.2d 773 (Del. 1980). The Delaware Supreme Court
found that the purpose of the notice requirement was threefold: "it gives debtor the opportunity to
exercise his redemption rights under S 9-506 . . . it affords the debtor an opportunity to seek out
buyers . . . and . . . it allows the debtor to oversee every aspect of the disposition, thus maximizing
the probability that a fair sales price will be obtained." Id. at 776. See State Bank of Towner v.
Hansen, 302 N.W.2d 760, 765; U.C.C. S 9-504 comments 1,5 (1973).
13. See.l. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE S 26.9, at 1109 (2d ed. 1980). If
the price obtained for collateral is high, the amount of the .judgment will be low. The importance of
the terms contained in the notice lies almost exclusively in the extent they protect against an unfair
low price. Id. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Farrar, 231 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Iowa 1975) (discussion
of purposes for requiring notice).
14. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Farrar, 231 N.W.2d at 605. The court in Farrar stated the
purpose of notice, under the Iowa counterpart of section 9-504 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
was to permit the debtor to bid at the sale or to protect himself from an inadequate sale price. Id.
15. 2 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 27-38 (1922). Approved in 1918, the U.C.S.A. was withdrawn in
1943, at which, date 11 jurisdictions had adopted it. North Dakota was not one of them. See
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE 67 (1943).
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16. See Commercial Credit Corp. v. Swiderski, 57 Del. 76, 195 A.2d 546 (Del. Super. Ct.), reh'g
denied, 57 Del. 76, 196 A.2d 214 (Del. Super. Ct. 1963) (failure to give statutory notice of resale of car
discharges buyer from contract); Frantz Equip. Co. v. Anderson, 37 N.J. 420, 181 A.2d 499 (1962)
(noncompliance with statutory provisions governing resale deprives seller of right to deficiency
judgment). See also 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 1013 (1980). A seller's right to repossessed goods depends on
statutory guidelines. The seller's rights are as follows:
Under the tU.C.S.A.1, the seller could either notify the buyer of his intention to retake
the goods upon default or retake without notice and then retain the goods for a ten-day
period during which the buyer might redeem. . . . If the buyer did not redeem the
goods and had paid at least fifty percent of their purchase price, the seller was required
to sell the goods at public auction, with notice to both the buyer and the public. If less
than fifty percent of the purchase price had been paid, the buyer could demand the
sale of the goods. Absent such demand, the seller could voluntarily resell the goods or
retain them as his own, thus discharging the buyer of liability for the balance due ....
The proceeds of any resale were applied to costs of resale . . . and the satisfaction of the
debt. The buyer was entitled to any surplus and was liable for any deficiency.
Id. at 1016-17 (footnotes omitted).
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The 1972 official text of the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.), adopted by North Dakota, 7 subjects "reasonable
notice" of disposition of collateral under section 9-504(3) of the
U.C.C. to two exceptions. 8 The exceptions control notice if
collateral can be found to be "perishable or threatens to decline
speedily in value,'' 19 or if the collateral is "customarily sold on a
recognized market. "20
The notice exception for collateral "customarily sold in :I
recognized market" on its face, implies a regular sales market for a
specific or similiar line of products. 2 1 However, the term
''recognized market" has been interpreted quite restrictively to
2
mean only stock markets or commodity markets. 2
The major purpose for giving and requiring notice is for the
debtor's protection against a low resale price. 23 The "perishable"
17. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 13, at 5. By 1968, 49 states had adopted the U.C.C. In 1974
Louisiana adopted portions of the 1972 official text to complete the adoption by all 50 states of all or
portions of the U.C.C. Id. North Dakota enacted the U.CC. on March 19, 1965, effective.July 1,
1966. 1965 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 296. In 1973 North Dakota became one of several states to adopt the
1972 official text of the U.C.C. 1973 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 343.
18. N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-50(3) (Supp. 1981) (U.C.C. § 9-504(3)). The exceptions
provided in the North Dakota Century Code are that no notice is required "when the collateral is
perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized
market." Id.
19. Id. See 302 N.W.2d at 765-66. The Hansen court found from the record of the trial court that
no evidence was offered to establish the condition of the cattle as being subject to rot or loss of
significant value in a short time frame. The court took notice of'the significant delay between
repossession and resale and determined that in any event ample time existed to furnish Hansen
with notice of the sale. Id. See United States v. Mid-States Sales Co., 366 F. Supp. 1099, 1103 (D.
Neb. 1971). The court in Mid-States Sales Co. found that cattle were not perishable or subject to a
speedy decline in value as viewed from the record at trial. Lacking such evidence, the court found
that a two-week gap between a request to take back the cattle and time of sale was ample time to
furnish notice. Id.
20. N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-50(3) (Supp. 1981) (U.C.C. § 9-504(3)). See 302 N.W.2d at 765.
The Hansen court found that "oInly those items ofcollateral which are commonly sold on a market
such as the stock market or the commodity market wherein the price at any given moment is fixed
and is free from an individualized competitive bidding process fall within the category of 'recognized
market' collateral which is exempt under Section 41-09-50, N.D.C.C., [9-504, U.C.C." Id. Seealso
Norton v. National Bank of Commerce of Pine Bluff, 240 Ark. 143, __
, 398 S.W.2d 538, 540
(1966) (stock and commodity markets deemed "recognized markets").
21. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Farrar, 231 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Iowa 1975); State
Bank ofTowner v. Hansen, 302 N.W.2d 760, 765 (N.D. 1981); O'Neil v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 533
S.W.2d 832, 836 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975), rev'don othergrounds, 542 S.W.2d 112, 116 (Tex. 1976). See
also WHtTE & SUMMERS, supra note 13, at 1111. The secured creditors in O'Neil and Farrar tried to
claim the exception of "recognized markets" for trucks and autos. In both cases the creditors sought
to show by implication a distinct and commonly accepted sales market via dealership, wholesale
markets. The courts, however, did not agree. 231 N.W.2d at 605; 533 S.W.2d at 836.
22. Norton v. National Bank ofCommerc- cf Pine Bluff, 240 Ark. 143, 398 S'.W.2d 538 (1966).
In Norton the Arkansas Supreme Court defined "recognized market" as follows:
Obviously the Code dispenses with notice in this situation only because the debtor
would not be prejudiced by the want of notice. Thus a "recognized market" might
well be a stock market or a commodity market, where sales involve many items so
similar that individual differences are nonexistent or immaterial, where haggling and
competitive bidding are not primary factors in each sale, and where the prices paid in
actual sales of comparable property are currently available by quotation.
Id.at __
398 S.W.2d at 540.
23. See Wilmington Trust Co. v. Conner, 415 A.2d 77", 776 (Del. 1980). See supra note 12 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the purpose of the notice requirement.
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and "recognized market" notice exceptions, however, can be
24
important to the creditor without being prejudicial to the debtor.
Therefore, benefit to both debtor and creditor is derived by
25
application of these exceptions.
Courts reviewing actions for deficiency judgments have
available three separate and distinct applications of law. 26 The
three theories have been classified as the "absolute bar," "shift,"
27
and "set-off" theories.
The "absolute bar" theory represents the case law of those
jurisdictions that totally bar a creditor from a deficiency judgment
when he has failed to comply with U.C.C. provisions. 28 Modern
proponents of the "absolute bar" theory generally justify its
application by applying U.C.C. sections 1-10329 and 9-5073° as
24. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 13, at II11. Both the debtor and the creditor stand to gain
by obtaining high sale prices on repossessed collateral. The time consumed giving notice might have
a disastrous effect if such collateral is perishable or threatening to decline speedily in value or about
to rot for lack of refrigeration or proper storage. Id. The value of this exception to both creditor and
debtor is obvious under these and similar conditions. The facts, however, must clearly substantiate
that the collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value. See, e.g., United States v.
Mid-States Sales, Co., 336 F. Supp. at 1103.
When collateral is "customarily sold in a recognized market" the debtor does not need the
protection afforded by notice because supply and demand in places such as the New York Stock
Exchange, determine the price and value of the goods. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note i3, at 1111.
Additionally, such markets are relatively free from human conspiracy and manipulation. Id. See
United States v. Mid-States Sales Co., 336 F. Supp. at 1103 (cattle were not sold in a recognized
market); State Bank ofTowner v. Hansen, 302 N.W.2d at 765 (cattle and farm machinery were not
sold in a recognized market).
25. U.C.C. § 9-504(l)(b), (2) (1973) (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-50 (1)(b), (2) (Supp.
1981)). These sections of the U.C.C. provide the creditor with the power to apply the sale proceeds,
after payment of the sale expenses, to the indebtedness secured by the collateral sold. Id.
Furthermore, a secured creditor must account to the debtor for any surplus and unless otherwise
agreed, the debtor is liable for any remaining and unpaid indebtedness. This power of offset and
deficiency liability likely will result in the best price possible. The creditor will receive a maximum
offset against the debt, and the debtor receives the best possible price without worry of spoilage or
manipulation. See id.
26. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Conner, 415 A.2d at 777-78. The three applications identified by
the Wilmington Trust court were the "absolute bar," the "set-off," and the "shift" theories, Id. The
Delaware Supreme Court in Wilmington Trust adopted the "absolute bar" theory, which was well
settled law in Delaware under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. Id. at 779.
27. Id. at 777-78. The applications are named after the result and style of determination in
deficiency cases. Under the "absolute bar" theory the right to a deficiency is totally barred when
there has been some form of creditor misbehavior. Id. Courts using this theory generally find strict
compliance with the Code a condition precedent to the award ofa deficiency. See id.
The "set-off" application provides a creditor with an absolute right to receive a deficiency judgment, but a debtor is allowed to setoff his or her damages arising under section 9-507(l) of the
U.C.C. against the deficiency awarded. Id. at 778. The "shift" application allows a deficiency, but
in cases of creditor misconduct, the value of the collateral is presumed equal to the debt and the
burden of proving a deficiency is shifted to the creditor. Only upon successfully rebutting the
presumption is a deficiency judgment entered. Id. See Bank of Gering v. Glover, 192 Neb. 575, 579,
223 N.W.2d 56, 58-59 (1974) (discussion on holding strict compliance with Code a condition
precedent). See also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 13, at 1127-34; 45 Mo. L. REV. 162, 165-66 (1980)
(discussion of the different deficiency remedies).
28. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 13, at 1128 n.170. The states that appear to impose an
absolute bar on recovery of a deficiency judgment by noncomplying secured creditors are California,
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois (split), Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts (split), New
York (split), Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. at 1134 n.191.
Accord45 Mo. L. REV. 162, 165 n.17.
29. N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-01-03 (1968) (UC.C. 5 1-103). This section of the U.C.C.
incorporates the general rules of common law and equity unless specifically exempted by the Code.
Id.
30. Id. S 41-09-53 (1968) (U.C.C. S 9-507). Section 41-09-53 provides the debtor with remedies
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statutory authority. 3 1 Generally case law adhering to the "absolute
bar" theory denied deficiency judgments because of strict statutory
notice requirements. 32 As a result, strict compliance with U.C.C.
provisions became a prerequisite to obtaining a deficiency
judgment. 33 Furthermore, proponents citing the case law
interpreting notice requirements under the U.C.S.A., claim the
U.C.C. drafters purposely chose not to alter an accepted debtor
remedy.34

The opponents to the "absolute bar" theory claim the results
obtained by its application are harsh and punitive to the creditor. 35
fbr a icditor's failure to comply with the statute under the U.C.C. This section does not provide for
punititve damages. Id. But see.John Deere Co. v. Nygard Equip.. Inc., 225 N.W.2d 80 (N.D. 1974).
In Nygard a farm implement manufacturer terminated a dealer's franchise and seized and sold its
property valued in excess of amounts owing pursuant to the security agreement entered into between
the parties. The court granted punitive damages because the factsindicated the existence of malice,
oppression and fraud. Id. at 95. The court, however, did not decide whether faulty compliance tinder
the U.C.C. would have supported the same award. Id.
31. C.IT. Corp. v. Haynes, 161 Me. 353, 358, 212 A.2d 436, 439 (1965). The court in Haynes
denied a deficiency.judgment using the rationale that, under pre-Code commercial law, most courts
had denied such .judgments and no reasonable justification existed to change applicable case law. Id.
See Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696, 702 (W.D. Pa. 1963), rev'don other
grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964) (in lack of notice cases the debtor loses his opportunity to protect
his interest by repurchasing the collateral or by being present at the sale); Wilmington Trust Co. v.
Conner, 415 A.2d 773, 780 (Del. 1980) (section 9-507 is not adequate to protect debtor and is not
debtor's exclusive remedy); Camden Nat'l Bank v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d 329, 332 (Me. 1973) (nothing
in the language of section 9-507 of the U.C.C suggested that the section was the debtor's exclusive
remedy).
32. See, e.g., Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Wathen, 288 Md. 119, 414 A.2d 1261 (1980). In Wathen
the court found that permitting a deficiency.judgment would nullify debtor's notice and participation
rights and permit a continuation of bad faith by creditors, which the U.C.C. sought to correct. Id. at
__
414 A.2d at 1264. This belief was strengthened further by the ease with which a creditor may
provide notice under section 9-504 of the U.C.C. Id. The U.C.C. provides for only reasonable notice
and lacks the specificity of the U.C.S.A. See 2 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 27-38 (1922); U.C.C. 5 9-504(3)
(1972) (codified at N.D. CENT. CoDE S 41-09-50(3) (Supp. 1981)). See also Skeels v. Universal C. I.T.
Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696, 702 (W.D. Pa. 1963) (disposition without notice denies debtor his
right of redemption).
33. Bank ofGering v. Glover, 192 Neb. 575, 223 N.W.2d 56 (1974). The Gering court used the
following as its reason for finding notice a prerequisite to obtaining a deficiency judgment:
The creditor is given several options in disposing of collateral and very minimal
formal requirements. The burden on the secured creditor is to comply with the law.
The act [U.C.C.1 is framed in his interest. It is not onerous to require him to give
notice of the time and place of sale .... On the other hand, to permit him to proceed
otherwise does place an onerous burden on the debtor. It prevents the debtor from
taking steps to protect his interests at the sale.
Id.at 579, 233 N.W.2d at 59.
34. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 1091, 323
N.Y.S. 2d 13, 15 (Civ. Ct. 1971). In Leasco the court reasoned:
If the authors of the U.C.C. proposed to overthrow the firmly established and
generally accepted construction of the older statute [Uniform Conditional Sales Actl
denying recovery for a deficiency where there was not precise compliance with the
notice requirement, they surely would have manifested that intent in clear and
unambiguous language. !n fact, there is not the slightest intimation of any such
purpose to be found in the U.C.C.
Id. (citation omitted).
35. See, e.g., State Bank of Burleigh County Trust Co. v. All-American Sub, Inc., 289 N.W.2d
772 (N.D. 1980). In All-American Sub the North Dakota Supreme Court found that the "shift"
deficiency theory was "more in the spirit of commercial reasonableness." Id. at 780.
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36

Courts,
Therefore, the "shift" and "set-off" theories resulted.
citing U.C.C. sections 1-10611 and 9-50738 and the Code's

apparent lack of specific language, have held that the "absolute
bar" theory totally conflicts with the spirit of commercial
reasonableness entwined in the U.C.C. 3 9 Furthermore, the courts
declared that under the "shift" theory, a non-complying creditor,
before receiving a deficiency judgment, must rebut a presumption
that the collateral is equal to the value of the secured
indebtedness.40

4
Before the court in State Bank of Towner v. Hansen l reviewed the
deficiency judgment, it examined the creditor's defenses for not
providing notice. 4 2 In addressing one of the creditor's notice
exceptions, the one of perishability,4 3 the Hansen court relied on
factual evidence and testimony to determine that there had been
adequate time for the creditor to furnish reasonable notice to the
debtor. 4 Under the facts of the case livestock and farm machinery,
36. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 13, at 1132 n.187. the states that appear to apply the
presumption or shift approach against secured creditors are Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut,
Illinois (split), Indiana, Texas, Alaska, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Dakota, North Carolina and Rhode Island. Id. at 1134 n. 193. See also Universal C.I.T. Credit Co. v.
Rone, 248 Ark. 665, 453 S.W.2d 37 (1970); Levers v. Rio King Land and Inv. Co., 93 Nev. 95, 560
P.2d 917 (1977); Clark Leasing Corp v. White Sands Forest Prods., Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 535 P.2d
1077 (1975).
37. N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-01-06 (1968) (U.C.C. § 1-106). Section 41-01-06 provides as follows:
The remedies provided by this title shall be liberally administered to the end that
the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully
performed but neither consequential or special nor penal damages may be had except
as specifically provided in this title or by other rule of law.
Any right or obligation declared by this title is enforceable by action unless the
provision declaring it specifies a different and limited effect.

Id.
38. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-09-53 (1968) (U.C.C. § 9-507).
, 370 N.E.2d 918 (1977). In settling
Ind. App.
39. Hall v. Owen County State Bank, for the "shift" or presumption application, the Hall court determined that the U.C.C. was intended
to do away with rigid rules of laws designed to govern all situations in favor of more fluid guidelines,
which allow case by case analysis. It was hoped that this procedure would allow parties to reach the
, 370 N.E.2d
merits of the case instead of becoming entangled in procedural technicalities. Id. at __
at 927 (citing 2 GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS AND PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.9.4, at 1264 (1965)).
40. Id. at __ , 370 N.E.2d at 928. The court in adopting the shifting of the burden of proof
from the debtor to creditor and requiring the presumption to be rebutted, stated the following:
We think that this is a sound policy, for in cases where the debtor was not notified of
impending sale, the creditor should be in a much better position to prove the value of
collateral at the time of disposition. Furthermore, it seems fundamentally unfair to put
the burden of showing value of collateral after it has been repossessed and sold upon
the debtor who has received insufficient notice of disposition.
Id. (citations omitted). See State Bank of Burleigh County Trust Co. v. All-American Sub, 289
N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1980) (the shift or presumption application prevents harsh and punitive results
against the creditor).
41. 302 N.W.2d 760.
42. 302 N.W.2d at 765-66. In Hansen, Appellee-Towner conceded that no notice was given to
Hansen prior to the sale of any of the collateral. Appellee-Towner claimed no notice was necessary
since the livestock and farm machinery were perishable or sold on recognized markets. Both factors
are exceptions to the notice requirements under section 9-504 of the U.C.C. Id. (construing N.D.
CENT. CODE S 41-09-50 (Supp. 1981) (U.C.C. S9-504)).
43. Id. at 765.
44. Id. (citing United States v. Mid-States Sales Co., 336 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Neb. 1971)). The
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as a matter of law, were not "perishable" and thus the exception
45
would not circumvent the notice requirement.
The creditor alternatively raised the issue of collateral
"customarily sold in a recognized market" and, therefore, no
notice was required.4 6 In addressing the "recognized market"
exception the Hansen court cited Norton v. National Bank of Commerce
of Pine Blufft7 and determined that a "recognized market" meant
only markets which had fixed prices at any moment and in which
the sales themselves were free from haggling and competitive
bidding.4 8 Thus, equipment auction sales and livestock sales, the
success being determined by the competitive bidding of
participants, did not fall within the statutory "recognized market"
exception to notice.4 9 The Hansen court agreed with the court in
O'Neil v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 50 that the term "recognized market"
was most restrictive under the U.C.C.

51

Accordingly, the Hansen

court held that livestock and farm machinery were collateral not
customarily sold in a recognized market.5 2 Therefore, as a matter
53
of law, reasonable notice was required by statute.
court in Hansen relied on the testimony of the witnesses and inferred from the 18-20 day gap between
the date of repossession and date of sale that the collateral was not perishable. As in Mid-States, 336 F.
Supp. 1099, the court in Hansen determined that sufficient time was available to have furnished
reasonable notice as provided by section 9-504(3) of the U.C.C. 302 N.W.2d at 765.
45. 302 N.W.2d at 765.
46. N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-50(3) (Supp. 1981) (U.C.C. § 9-504(3)) (notice exception for
creditors with respect to perishable goods). See302 N.W.2d at 765.
47. 302 N.W.2d at 756 (citing Norton v. National Bank of Commerce of Pine Bluff, 240 Ark.
143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966)). In determining that used cars are not sold in a recognized market, the
Arkansas Supreme Court in Norton stated:
Obviously the Code dispenses with notice in this situation only because the debtor
would not be prejudiced by the want of notice. Thus a "recognized market" might
well be a stock market or a commodity mark-,t, where sales involve many items so
similar that individual differences are nonexistent or immaterial, where haggling and
competitive bidding are not primary factors in each sale, and where the prices paid in
actual sales of comparable property are currently available by quotation.
240 Ark. at __,
398 S.W.2d at 540. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 13, at 1111 (defines a
recognized market as one similar to the New York Stock Exchange).
48. 302 N.W.2d at 765. See Norton v. National Bank of Commerce of Pine Bluff, 240 Ark.
143, 298 S.W.2d 538 (1966); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Farrar, 231 N.W.2d 602 (Iowa 1975);
O'Neil v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 533 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 542
S.W.2d 112 (Tex. 1976).
49. 302 N.W.2d at 765.
50. 533 S.W.2d 832, 836 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975), rev'don other grounds, 542 S.W.2d 112 (Tex.
1976).
51. 302 N.W.2d at 765.
52. Id. The Hansen court determined that auction sales and livestock sales cannot satisfy the
restrictive definition of "recognized market." The sole purpose of auction type sales is to get as high
a price as possible. To do this, however, the participants are enticed into competitive bidding.
Generally, the biddin, is more competitive with larger groups of participants. Under no
circmstances can an auction sale compare to the case law definition. See id. See also Norton v.
National Bank of Commcrce of Pine Bluff, 240 Ark. 143, _,
398 S.W.2d 538, 540 (1966); WHITE
& SUMMERS, supra note 13, at 1111.
53. 302 N.W.2d at 76L. The trial court had presented the notice issue as a question of fact to the
Jury. The North Dakota Supreme Court, however, ruled this was in error because the jury was not
required to return a special verdict on this point. The supreme court remanded the case for a new

CASE COMMENT

The Hansen court next addressed the debtor's assertion that
failure to furnish notice should result in an "absolute bar" of the
creditor's deficiency judgment.5 4 Relying on precedent established
55
by State Bank of Burleigh County Trust Co. v. All-American Sub, Inc.,
the Hansen court ruled against the debtor and adopted the "shift"
or "presumption" theory as the appropriate deficiency judgment
application.5 6 The court in Hansen determined that the presumption
rightfully shifted to the creditor the burden of proving that the fair
market value of the collateral sold was not equal to the amount of
the debt.

57

The court noted the particular harsh and disproportionate
results that would be obtained by applying the absolute bar under
debtor's request. 58 If such punitive results were desired, the Hansen
court felt the drafters of the U.C.C. would have included express
language mandating it. 59 The court supported its reasoning by
reviewing applicable sections of the North Dakota Century Code,
60
which advocate commercial reasonableness.
By relying on its interpretation of applicable statutes and the
All American Sub precedent, the Hansen court allowed a deficiency
judgment only if the creditor could overcome a presumption that
the fair market value of the collateral sold was equal to the
indebtedness. 6 1 Once the presumption was rebutted the creditor's
trial with the jury to receive instruction that as a matter of law the debtor is entitled to notice
pursuant to section 41-09-50(3) of the North Dakota Century Code. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. COE S
41-09-50(3) (Supp. 1981) (U.C.C. § 9-504(3))).
54. Id. at 766-67. Hansen attempted to establish precedent in North Dakota by citing a preU.C.C. case concerning warehousemen receipts and notice. Id. at 766 n.2 (citing Heaton v. Hoerr,
66 N.D. 430, 266 N.W. 261 (1936)). (a warehouseman's sale of grain to satisfy a lien for storage
charges without compliance with the notice statute was void and, therefore, could not recover a
deficiency).
55. 289 N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1980). All-American Sub, Inc. was the first case in which the North
Dakota Supreme Court used the presumption or shifting of burden theory.
56. 302 N.W.2d 766-68 (citing State Bank of Burleigh County v. All-American Sub, Inc., 289
N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1980)). The Hansen court particularly disliked the harsh and disproportionate
results promulgated by the "absolute bar" theory. The creditor stood to lose more than $200,000 if
barred from a deficiency judgment. The court thought that the application of the "absolute bar"
theory would be similar to an award of punitive damages, which the U.C.C. does not provide. Thus,
in the spirit of commercial reasonableness, the Hansen court reasoned that the presumption method
was the better compromise. Id.
, 370 N.E.2d at 928).
Ind. App. at __
57. Id. at 768 (citing Hall v. Owen State Bank, __
The court in Hall found it fundamentally unfair that the debtor, who received insufficient notice of
sale, be required to prove the value of collateral sold by the creditor. At the time of disposition the
misbehaving creditor should be in a much better position to prove the fair market value of the
370 N.E. 2d at 928.
Ind. App. at __,
repossessed collateral. 58. 302 N.W.2d at 767.
59. Id.
60. Id. The Hansen court paid close attention to the liberal remedies and to the desire to place
parties in as good a position as if the defaulting party had performed. The court also noted that the
U.C.C. specifically provides no punitive damages to debtors. Id. (construing N.D. CENT. CODE §5
41-01-06, -09-53 (1968) (U.C.C. S 1-106, 9-507)).
61. 302 N.W.2d at 766 (citing State Bank of Burleigh County v. All-American Sub Inc., 289
Ind. App.
-,
N.W.2d 772, 779-80 (N.D. 1980)). See Hall v. Owen County State Bank, __
, 370 N.E.2d 918, 928 (1977) (presumption theory followed); Levers v. Rio King Land & Inv.
__
-, 560 P.2d 917, 920 (1977) (presumption theory followed).
Co., 93 Nev. 95,
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deficiency could be computed using the greater of collateral value
as proven or the amount received from collateral sold. 62 The court
further directed that once noncompliance was determined the
creditor could not rely on the price received at the sale, but must
introduce other credible and objective evidence to rebut the
presumption.

63

The court was thus satisfied that the spirit of commercial
reasonableness entwined in the U.C.C. was upheld. 64 The creditor
was given an opportunity to prove and obtain a deficiency
judgment, regardless of accidental or intentional error, and the
debtor was reasonably protected from prejudicial treatment by
65
repossessing creditors.
The holding of the Hansen decision firmly established the
notice requirement in creditor disposition of repossessed livestock
and farm machinery. 66 Although the "perishable or threatening to
decline speedily in value" exception is still a factual question, the
court in Hansen reasoned that the "customarily sold in a recognized
market" exception did not include livestock and equipment auction
sales.

67

One implication of Hansen is the arguably deterrent effect the
shifting of the burden may have on noncomplying creditors.
Although the presumption that the collateral is equal to the value of
62. 302 N.W.2d at 767. The North Dakota Supreme Court established a two-part test for the
limitation of a deficiency.judgment. The calculation is as follows:
Upon overcoming such presumption the secured creditor will only be allowed to
recover a deficiency for the lesser of: (a) the difference between the indebtedness and
the fair market value of the collateral sold, or (b) the difference between the
indebtedness and the actual amount received upon sale of the collateral.
Id.
63. Id. at 768. See Universal C.I.T. Credit Co. v. Rone, 248 Ark. 665, 669, 453 S.W.2d 37, 3840 (1970). In Rone the creditor repossessed and sold a pickup truck and car without furnishing notice
to Rone. The court imposed the presumption theory and the creditor sought to rebut with employee
testimony. The court refused to allow this testimony because the issue was the fair market value and
not what price was received. The court stated that because the sale did not conform with the statute,
more than evidence of the sales price would be needed to rebut the presumption. Id. at 40.
64. 302 N.W.2d at 767 (construing N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-01-06 (1968) (U.C.C. § 1-106)).
Section 41-01-06 of the North Dakota Century Code concerns the liberal treatment of remedies as to
all parties and provides that damages are limited to compensatory damages. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 4101-06 (1968) (U.C.C. § 1- 106). See also id. § 41-01-02 (U.C.C. § 1-102). Subsection one of section 4101 -02 provides that the title shall be liberally construed and applied. Id. 41-01-02(1). Subsection
two speaks of the purposes and policies of this act. Id. § 41-01-02(2). Subsection three provides that
provisions of the act may be varied by agreement, except when otherwise provided and the
obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care may not be disclaimed. Id. § 41-0102(3).
65. 302 N.W.2d at 768. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for
a new trial in accordance with the views expressed in the opinion. Id. The case was settled prior to a
new trial. Hansen was allowed possession and title to his real property by agreeing to apply oil
royalties to a stipulated deficiency. Telephone interview with Sherry Mills Moore, Att'y for
Appellant, State Bank ofTowner v. Hansen, 302 N.W.2d 760 (1981) (Feb. 19, 1982).
66. Id. at 766.
67. Id. at 765 (citing Norton v. National Bank of Commerce of Pine Bluff, 240 Ark. 143, 398
S.W.2d 538 (1966)). See N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-50(3) (Supp. 1981) (U.C.C. § 9-504).
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the secured indebtedness appears to penalize a creditor, it actually
acts as a deterrent only when the creditor does not meet his notice
requirement and when the value of the collateral is less than the
outstanding debt.
Two factors seem to prevent the placing of the burden of proof
on the creditor from serving as a sufficient deterrent. First, the
Hansen court did require evidence other than the price derived from
the sale and testimony from the creditor's employees. 68 Whether
the additional evidence presented is sufficient to rebut the
presumption, however, is an ad hoc determination to be made by
the trier of fact. In Hall v. Owen County State Bank69 the Bank
overcame the presumption with minimal evidence of value, by
showing good faith efforts and a commercially reasonable sale.7 0 In
contrast, in Wirth v. Hearvey,7 1 evidence of the creditor's valuation
combined with the original purchase agreement was sufficient to
rebut the presumption.7 2 The apparent ease with which creditors
may overcome the presumption should serve warning to debtors
that although it is the creditor that bears the burden, the debtor
must be prepared to offer counterevidence or run the risk of a
73
directed verdict.
The second factor which prevents deterrance is that in a sale at
less than value the court will allow a deficiency only to the extent of
value as proven minus the indebtedness. 74 This can not have a
68. 302 N.W.2d at 768.
69. -. Ind. App. -, 370 N.E.2d 918 (1977).
70. Hall v. Owen County State Bank, Ind. App.
370 N.E.2d 918, 929 (1977).
The Hall court considered the question of overcoming the presumption to be one of fact, which was
to be decided from all aspects of the sale. The court did not distinguish between the value of the
collateral and the reasonableness of the sale. The court in Hall determined that a commercially
reasonable sale properly established the value of the collateral. Id.
71. 508 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. 1974). In Wirth the value placed on the collateral by the creditor
amounted to $650. The court found that this was a fair value after interpreting the sales contract. Id.
at 269.
72. 508 S.W. 2d at 268.
73. See Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest Prods., Inc., 87 N.M. 451,
-_, 535 P.2d
1077, 1080 (1975). The Clark court found the creditor must prove that a commercially reasonable
sale was made. However, once the creditor has established a prima facie case, the debtor must
present evidence to avoid a directed verdict. Id.
74. See 302 N.W.2d at 767. Three examples of deficiency Judgments calculated under the
presumption application as defined by the North Dakota Supreme Court are shown below. The
problems assume noncompliance and that the presumption has been overcome.
A.

Debt
$10,000
Collateral fair market value
7,000
Collateral sold for
3,000
Results under Hansen presumption, lesser of:
1) Debt $10,000
-FMV
7,000
Deficiency

$ 3,000

Creditor receives
deficiency of

$ 3,000

2) Debt
-Sold
for

$10,000
3,000
$ 7,000
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deterrent effect because the creditor receives what he would have
received regardless of the notice deficiency. In fact, an incentive
may be hiding here should the debtor elect to default and not
defend the action.
Currently under section 9-507 of the U.C.C., only
compensatory damages are available to a debtor for noncompliance
by a creditor. 7 This means that attorney fees and other costs of
litigation are not recoverable, even though these costs are directly
related to the creditor's noncompliance. The debtor must now
weigh the costs of litigation against any increment to be gained by
resisting a deficiency judgment.
Finally, the debtor under section 9-506 of the U.C.C. has the
right at any time before the secured party disposes of the collateral
to redeem the collateral. 76 Currently, it appears a debtor would
B.

C.

$10,000
=
Debt
3,000
Collateral fair market value
Collateral sold for
=
3,000
Result under Hansen presumption, lesser of:
1) Debt $10,000
-FMV
3,000
Deficiency

$ 7,000

Creditor receives
deficiency of'

$ 7,000

Debt
=
$10,000
Collateral fair market value
=
2,500
Collateral sold for
3,000
Results under Hansen presumption, lesser of:
1) Debt $10,000
-FMV
2,500
Deficiency

$ 7,500

Creditor receives
deficiency of

$ 7,000

2) Debt
-Sold
for

$10,000
3,000
$ 7,000

2) Debt
-Sold
for

$10,000
3,000
$ 7,000

75. N. D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-53(l) (1968) (U.C.C. §9-507(l)). Section 41-09-53(l) provides in
part:
If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in accordance with the
provisions of this part disposition may be ordered or restrained on appropriate terms
and conditions. If the disposition has occurred the debtor or any person entitled to
notification or whose security interest has been made known to the secured party prior
to the disposition has a right to recover from the secured party any loss caused by a
failure to comply with the provisions of this part. If the collateral is consumer goods,
the debtor has a right to recover in any event an amount not less than the credit service
charge plus ten percent of the principal amount of the debt or the time price
differential plus ten percent of the cash price.
Id.
76. Id. § 41-09-52 (1968) (U.C.C. 5 9-506). Section 41-09-52 of the North Dakota Century Code
provides:
At any time before the secured party has disposed of collateral or entered into a
contract for its disposition under section 41-09-50 or before the obligation has been
discharged under subsection 2 of section 41-09-51, the debtor or any other secured
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have no redress for the loss of his right to redeem, which was caused
by the noncompliance of the creditor in the sale of collateral
without notice.
The significant split among states in this area suggests that
neither method of deficiency is better.7 7 Until section 9-504(3) is
legislatively amended or the case law changes, the "presumption"
theory on deficiency judgments is the law in North Dakota.7 8

MICHAEL E..JUNTUNEN

party may unless otherwise agreed in writing after default redeem the collateral by
tendering fulfillment of all obligations secured by the collateral as well as the expenses
rcasonablv incurred by the secured part in retaking. holding and preparing the
collateral for disposition, in arranging for the sale, and to the extent provided in the
agreement and not prohibited by law, his reasonable attorneys' fees and legal
expenses.
Id.
77. See45 Mo. L. REV. 162, 169 (1980) (amendment to article 9 ofthe U.C.C. recommended as
the best way to settle thi issue of whether to grant a defliciency judgment).
78. 302 N.W.2d at 768. The Hansen court extended the presumption theory to situations in
which the debtor asserts that the secured creditor has failed "to dispose of the collateral in a
commercially reasonable manner." Id.

